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Abstract 
In an imperfect capital market, external funds are more costly than internal funds. Firms face financial constraints and many 
studies suggest that firms’ investments depend on the availability of internal funds. Financial liberalization plays the role of 
relaxing financial constraints on firms and thereby reduces the sensitivity of investments to cash flow. In addition to examining 
whether financial liberalization affects firms’ investment behavior, an innovative approach explores the role of real estate as 
collateral and addresses a potential censoring problem. Using panel data on Tunisian firms, we find that cash flow effects on 
investment decrease as financial markets are liberalized. In particular, “Pulp, Paper and Cardboard” industry firms are found to 
gain most from liberalization. However, possessing real estate is important in a firm’s investment behavior but decreases with 
financial liberalization.  
 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent financial crises have spurred a renewed interest in the effects of financial deregulation in emerging 
markets. While some theoretical research and empirical analysis at the macroeconomic level has been undertaken in 
this area, empirical work using microeconomic data is still scarce. Most developing countries have initiated financial 
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liberalization process in the past decades. Financial liberalization has been implemented in both domestic and 
international scopes. The former includes deregulation of interest rates and a reduction of directed credit while the 
latter involves the opening of equity and bond markets. The effects of liberalization in financial markets on 
economic growth have received considerable attention in the literature. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) propose 
that liberalization can promote economic growth. More recently, financial endogenous growth models emphasize 
the role of financial development for growth. Among others, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001) empirically 
show that equity market opening leads to an increase in economic growth.  
Despite a lot of empirical evidence on the association between financial liberalization and economic growth, 
there is scant literature that clarifies the channel of liberalization effect. This paper attempts to make a contribution 
to this literature by examining the Tunisian case. Prior to 1986, Tunisia’s financial system was highly regulated. The 
government financed its deficits through increased reserve requirements in the domestic banking sector, and bank 
credit to the private sector plummeted. This situation changed in late 1986, when a comprehensive liberalization of 
the financial sector was initiated. This paper examines how these developments affected fixed investment using the 
manufacturing sector in the period 1999–2005. The questions that we seek to answer are: how was investment by 
manufacturing firms affected by financial reform? To what extent were firms financially constrained before and 
after liberalization? Which firm types and sectors benefited most from the increased availability of credit after 1986?  
Is there evidence for the importance often attributed to the role of collateral after financial liberalization?  
We first follow the standard methodology adopted in empirical work on the importance of liquidity constraints 
for firm-level investment. We examine the effect of the availability of internal funds on capital expenditures and its 
change over time across different types of firms that are likely to differ in their access to external finance. Then, 
going one step further, we also explicitly investigate the importance of collateral in the firm investment decision. 
Most existing literature splits the sample into pre-and post-liberalization periods according to an exogenous 
criterion and examines whether the degree of financial constraints differs between the two periods. Financial 
liberalization has, however, proceeded gradually and in multi-faceted ways. Furthermore, the pace of liberalization 
was sometimes reversed after a serious shock to economy. To capture such a nature of financial liberalization, we 
attempt to construct a continuous index by adopting a principal component method. The dataset consists of 268 
manufacture firms during 1996–2005. We estimate the cash-flow sensitivity of investment by applying the 
generalized methods of moments (GMM). The main findings in this paper are: firstly, financial liberalization 
significantly reduces the financial constraints confronted by firms. Secondly, the effect of financial liberalization on 
financial constraints is stronger for firms belonging to the “Pulp, Paper and Cardboard” industry. On the other hand, 
financial liberalization reduces the role of collateral in the investment decision. This suggests that various 
liberalization policies implemented in financial markets helped firms to get wider access to external finance.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the main literature on firms’ investment under 
financial constraints. We also summarize some existing empirical studies that investigate the effects of financial 
liberalization on investments. In Section 3, we review financial reform and investment in Tunisia.  We derive 
investment model in an imperfect financial market, discuss estimation methods and attempt to construct a financial 
liberalization index in Section 4. This section also contains a description of the data, definitions of relevant 
variables, estimation results and interpretation. Section 5 presents a switching regime model, discuss estimation 
methods, present estimation results and an interpretation. The last section contains a brief conclusion. 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Firms’ investments in an imperfect capital market  
 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), a firm’s investment depends only on the profitability of its 
investment opportunities. A growing body of literature, however, has found that the firms’ investment depends on 
the availability of internal funds. Many researchers attribute the effects of financial condition on investment to 
imperfections in financial markets that Modigliani and Miller’s model ignores.  
Two streams of literature investigate why investment is sensitive to internal funds in imperfect financial 
markets. The first focuses on a non-negligible premium for external finance that firms should pay. Myers and Majluf 
(1984) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) demonstrate that the cost of external funds is higher than that of internal funds 
because of the asymmetry of information between borrowers and lenders. Firms face a constraint in financial 
markets because of a wedge between costs of internal and external funds. Under such a financial constraint, firms 
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tend to rely on internal funds to finance investment. The second stream of literature attributes the importance of 
internal funds for investment to managerial agency problems. As noted by Jensen and Meckling (1976), managers 
who are not owners may pursue their own interests, not the stockholders’ interest. Jensen (1986) argues that 
managerial discretion is likely to cause managers to spend all available funds on investment projects.  
A large body of literature has empirically examined whether imperfections in financial markets influence firms’ 
investments. Most studies interpret the cash-flow effect on investment as resulting from financial constraints. 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) initially show that, utilizing the dividend–payout ratio as a measure of the 
financial constraints faced by firms, investments of more financially constrained firms are more sensitive to changes 
in cash flow. Since then, it has become a basic research methodology to examine the difference in sensitivities of 
investment to cash flow between a priori segmented firms. The existing empirical studies have used various 
segmenting variables to identify unobservable degree of financial constraints, for example: group affiliation in 
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991); firm size and age in Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990); issuing 
commercial paper and bond ratings in Whited (1992); exchange listing in Oliner and Rudebusch (1992); ownership 
structure in Schaller (1993); and country characteristics in Bond, Elston, Mairesse, and Lundblad (2003).  
2.2. The role of collateral 
 
Early studies demonstrated that existence of asymmetries in the evaluation of projects between banks and 
entrepreneurs may cause each entrepreneur to receive a smaller loan than demanded (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, 
Bester 1985); Later studies showed that collateral can be used to solve (partially) the problems caused by such 
asymmetric valuations. The role of collateral in loan contracts reflects the incentive and signaling effects, which 
resolve moral hazard and adverse selection problems under asymmetric information. If a loan is secured by a 
specific asset that serves as collateral, the borrower’s incentive to choose a riskier project after obtaining the loan is 
deterred. Moreover, collateralization may induce a borrower to reveal its otherwise hidden risks. Collateral can be in 
general of two types: inside or outside. A borrower can pledge as (inside) collateral an asset which is used in the 
project to be financed or as (outside) collateral assets which are not used in the project.  
However, collateralization may be costly for both contract partners. Lenders must evaluate and monitor 
collateral and bear the cost of liquidation and collateral utilization. Borrowers must prepare additional reports and 
tolerate restrictive asset usage (Leeth and Scott, 1989). The higher the specificity of the collateral asset or the less 
liquid it is, the higher are the costs imposed on the lender. The costs of evaluating, processing and liquidating 
collateral strongly depend on the legal and institutional environment. As has been shown by the recent literature on 
law and finance (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998), legal variables and the efficiency of the judicial system are important 
determinants of loan supply, affecting the protection of creditor rights.  
Credit constraints arise naturally due to the fact that lenders cannot force borrowers to repay their debts unless 
the debts are secured. In such an economy, durable assets (land, buildings and machinery) play a dual role: they are 
not only factors of production, but they also serve as collateral for loans. Borrowers’ credit limits are affected by the 
prices of the collateralized assets. And at the same time, these prices are affected by the size of the credit limits. 
Firm investment behavior is influenced by variables that increase its ability to contract external finance when 
investment demand is constrained by credit imperfections. One such variable is the tangibility of a firm’s assets. 
Assets that are more tangible sustain more external financing, because tangibility mitigates contractibility problems. 
Asset tangibility increases the value that can be recaptured by creditors in default states. Investment-cash flow 
sensitivities will be increasing in the tangibility of constrained firm assets. In contrast, tangibility will have no effect 
on investment-cash flow sensitivities of financially unconstrained firms. Crucially, asset tangibility itself affects the 
credit status of the firms. Firms with very tangible (pledgeable) assets are likely to become unconstrained. This 
implies a non-monotonic effect of tangibility on investment-cash flow sensitivities. (Almeida and Campello 2006). 
 
2.3. Financial liberalization and investment  
 
Many studies argue that financial liberalization causes the variations over time in the responsiveness of 
investment to internal fund. Financial liberalization influences asymmetric information and agency conflicts 
between managers and stockholders. In particular, various liberalization policies play the role of reducing 
asymmetric information problems in financial markets by improving banks’ screening ability. Also, managerial 
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agency problems are attenuated because financial institutions tend to monitor managers’ behavior more intensively. 
Developments in security markets and financial market opening also result in a reduction of the cost of external 
financing. We thus expect that financial liberalization reduces the wedge between the costs of external and internal 
funds and thereby decreases the cash-flow effect on investment of financially constrained firms.  
Although an increased availability of credit with the financial liberalization should have contributed to a reduction 
of liquidity constraints, there’s no reason to believe that informational and enforcement problems that motivate the 
use of collateral diminished after liberalization of the financial sector. Credit is extended mainly against collateral. 
However, many firms that previously were completely cut off from any credit were now in principle eligible for 
bank loans. For them possessing collateral is very important. These firms are new borrowers, whose risks were 
difficult to assess. On the bank’s side, credit expansion was accompanied by a comparable increase in their technical 
capacities. The type of lending conducted throughout the financial repression period had not fostered the 
development of credit analysis techniques. 
There is, however, mixed empirical evidence for the effect of financial liberalization on firms’ investment. 
Examining panel data of a large number of firms in 13 developing countries, Laeven (2003) concludes that financial 
liberalization relaxes financing constraints on firms, especially small ones. Several studies report that financial 
reform caused a reduction in financial constraints using an individual country data, for instance: Harris, 
Schiantarelli, and Siregar (1994) for Indonesia; Gelos and Werner (2002) for Mexico; Guncavdi, Bleaney, and 
McKay (1998) for Turkey; and Koo and Shin (2004) for Korea. Forbes (2003) recently shows that the Chilean 
capital controls increased financial constraints for small firms. Jaramillo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (1996), however, 
fail to provide evidence that financial reform in Ecuador served to ease financial constraints on small firms. Using 
Chilean data, Hermes and Lensink (1998) also report that reforms did not improve access of small and young firms 
to outside finance. In light of mixed empirical findings, we need to further investigate the effect of financial 
liberalization on firms’ investment.  
 
3. Financial reforms in Tunisia 
 
Before 1986, Tunisia was a textbook case of financial repression. Banks were forced to lend to the public sector 
through a mixture of measures: high reserve requirements, mandated lending to preferential sectors among them the 
public and the imposition of regulations forcing banks to hold a certain fraction of their assets in the form of 
government liabilities. Interest rate ceilings on deposit and loans put further restrictions on banking activities. 
Together with high and variable inflation, they led to volatile and mostly negative real interest rates  
In late 1986, a rapid process of financial deregulation was initiated. This liberalization was part of a broader 
reform package adopted in that year: the success in reducing government deficits and in bringing down inflation 
contributed significantly to facilitating these changes. The reforms included the abolition of interest rate ceilings, a 
phase-out of reserve requirements, the privatization of state banks, the elimination of barriers to entry for new banks 
and the elimination of priority lending quotas. A new law allowed banks to move into universal banking.  
Tunisian firms are generally small and medium family businesses. The bank credit remains the main instrument 
for funding. The credit structure is characterized by the importance of short term loans. The real interest rates are 
considered high. With the removal of priority activities funding ratio and the abolition of the Central Bank 
rediscount, it is harder for young and small firms to access the credit market without presenting collateral. The 
manufacturing industry represents the most dynamic component of the productive sector. 40% of the bank loans are 
accorded to the manufacturing industry. Long and medium term loans represent only 35% of the funding structure of 
manufacturing firms (CBT 2004). However they are ranked first in non-performing loans. 
 The transition from a situation of financial repression to one with freer financial markets is unlikely to be 
sufficient for ensuring that the financial system fulfills its function optimally. Problems stemming from asymmetric 
information, poor regulation, and weak law enforcement are likely to constitute an important obstacle to the access 
to external finance by firms in the credit markets.  
4. Impact of financial reforms on credit constraints: model, estimation method and results 
4.1. The Euler investment equation model  
 
Since the Q-model has certain limitations, a number of studies directly estimate the Euler equation. The 
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investment model in this paper is closely related to Bond and Meghir (1994) and Koo and Maeng (2005): 
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Here I , K , S , CF denote investment, the capital stock, the sales and the cash flow of firm i at time t, 
respectively, and fi and dt denote firm-specific effect and the time-specific effect respectively. 
If a measure of financial liberalization as well as the cash flow affects the degree of financial constraints, then 
equation 1 is modified into: 
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Next, we attempt to test whether financial liberalization has a different impact on the cash-flow sensitivity of 
investment across firm characteristics as size (Equation 3), exporter status (Equation 4) or Industry belonging 
(Equation 5): 
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4.2. Estimation method  
 
Dynamic investment models that we derive are likely to suffer from both endogeneity and heterogeneity 
problems. The error term in investment model generally captures a technology shock to the profit function. It is, 
however, known that many explanatory variables such as sales and cash flow also depend on the technology shock. 
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It means that explanatory variables in the investment function may be correlated with the error term. Hayashi and 
Inoue (1991) argued that many explanatory variables of investment such as output and cash flow depend on the 
technology shock, and are thus endogenous as well. In addition, the presence of the lagged investment-to-capital 
ratio as an explanatory variable may bias coefficient estimates from the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. 
Substantial differences across firms in their investment behavior may also result in a heterogeneity problem. The 
GMM estimation is widely used for dynamic panel data models. The success of the GMM technique depends on the 
appropriate adoption of instruments and elimination of unobserved firm effects. We will rely on the two 
specification tests developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). A Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions is used to 
test for the validity of instruments, and a test of serial correlation of error terms is used to detect the presence of 
unobserved individual effects. If there are no strong unobserved individual effects, we can apply the GMM 
technique to investment equation in levels. If specification test results suggest that unobserved firm effects remain, 
we can use the GMM technique in a difference model, following Arellano and Bover (1995).  
 
4.3. Financial liberalization index 
 
To investigate the effect of financial liberalization on investment, we need to construct a measure of financial 
liberalization. Most previous literature attempts to identify the liberalization date by examining a shift in various 
variables related to liberalization in financial markets. Then researchers divide the whole sample period into two 
sub-periods of before and after liberalization and investigate whether the financial constraint is significantly 
different between pre-and after-liberalized periods. In the actual economy, financial liberalization takes place in 
various dimensions and in stages. The conventional method, however, fails to properly reflect the gradual nature of 
the financial liberalization process. Furthermore, if financial liberalization involves reversals, it is a futile attempt to 
investigate the effect of financial liberalization on investment with the ‘before and after’ method. Recent studies 
tend to construct a continuous measure of financial liberalization to cure the limitation of a discrete index. We also 
need a continuous measure of financial liberalization to properly allow for the non-linear and gradual nature of 
liberalization in Tunisian financial markets.  
We constructed a financial liberalization index as follows. First, we derived annual data on the implementation 
of reform packages related to six different measures. The six reform variables include interest rate deregulation, 
reduction of policy loans, entry of new banks, privatization of state banks, capital market liberalization and stock 
exchange market liberalization. The initial value of each variable is set at zero. We add one at each step of the 
incremental process of liberalization. In figure 1, we present plots of six variables. To derive a single measure of 
financial liberalization from seven variables, we apply a principal component method. Because the first principal 
component explains more than 70% of variance, we will regard the first principal component as a financial 
liberalization index. (figure 2).
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Fig. 1: Plots of six financial reform variables 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: plot of financial liberalization index 
 
It presents the plot of the FLI. As expected, the FLI increases gradually over time. In 2002, the FLI increases 
again since some government-owned banks were privatized through a merger with large private banks.  
 
4.4. Data and variables  
 
We derived an unbalanced panel dataset of the manufacturing firms over the period 1999–2005. The data 
consists of 268 firms. The detailed description of relevant variables is presented in Table 1. We split the sample 
according to three exogenous characteristics of firms to test for a difference in the effect of financial liberalization 
on financing constraints between firms. As a measure of firm size, we use the firm total assets. A small size dummy 
variable, small, takes the value one if it’s among the 25% smallest total assets firm, and zero otherwise. Similarly, 
we construct a large size dummy variable, Large, which indicates large firms being among the 25% largest total 
assets firms. Firms were also classified as exporter and non exporter and sorted by industry affiliation. 
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Table 1  
Abbreviation  Description 
 
Kt  Capital at the end of period t (=tangible fixed assets at the end of the period t) 
  
It  Investment expenditure during the period t (K t+1 +Depreciations t - K t) 
 
CFt  Cash flow during the period t (=net profit after-tax + Depreciation during period t)  
 
St  Sales during the period t 
 
D t  Total debt (=long term debts + bank short term debts during the period t) 
 
LFt  Financial Liberalization index during the period t 
 
small  = 1 for small firms, =0 for no small firms 
 
large  =1 for large firms, =0 for no large firms 
 
exp  = 1 for exporter firms, =0 for non exporting firms 
 
nexp  = 1 for non exporter firms, = 0 for exporting firms 
 
SAgro  = 1 for « Agro alimentary » industry firms, =0 for no « Agro alimentary » industry firms 
 
SMCV = 1 for « Building Materials, Ceramic and Glass » industry firms, =0 for no « Building Materials,  
Ceramic and Glasses » industry firms 
 
SMEE  = 1 for « Mechanic, Electronic et Electric » industry firms, = 0 for no« Mechanic, Electronic et  
Electric » industry firms 
 
SCHPL  =1 for « Chemical and Plastic » industry firms, = 0 for no « Chemical and Plastic » industry firms 
 
STHC =1 for « Textile, Clothing and Leather » industry firms, = 0 for no « Textile, Clothing and  
Leather » industry firms 
 
SBLA  =1 for « Wood, Cork and Furniture » industry firms, =0 for no « Wood, Cork and Furniture » industry firms 
 
SPPC  = 1 for « Pulp, Paper and cardboard » industry firms, = 0 for no « Pulp, Paper and cardboard » industry firms 
 
Table 2 
   Note : mean, median and standard deviation are represented respectively 
 
“Mechanic, Electric and Electronic” firms have a significant median investment rate as well as strong 
investment opportunities measured by the median rate of sales. Moreover, this industry would generate important 
Industry I/K S/K CF/K 
 
Agro-alimentary  0,25(0,14) [0,35] 8,38 (3,01)   [21,74] 0,27 (0,24) [1,95] 
 
Building Materials, Ceramic 
 and Glass 
0,31 (0,16) [0,47] 3,46 (1,54) [5,69] 0,5 (0,24) [0,87] 
 
Mechanic, Electric and  
Electronic 
0,28 (0,16) [0,38] 7,89 (4,32) [12,15] 0,61 (0,35) [1,03] 
 
Chemical and Plastic 0,20 (0,11) [0,26] 4,34 (3,34) [4,31] 0,3 (0,28) [0,34] 
 
Textile, Clothing and Leather 0,24 (0,11) [0,42] 3,65 (2,78) [3,19] 0,47 (0,28) [0,64] 
 
Wood, Cork and Furniture 0,22 (0,12) [0,32] 6,11 (3,04) [10,84] 0,3 (0,23) [0,27] 
 
Pulp, Paper and Cardboard 
 
0,41 (0,17) [0,70] 
 
3,5 (2,1) [4,56] 
 
0,41 (0,3)[0,36] 
 
90   Amira Guermazi /  Procedia Economics and Finance  13 ( 2014 )  82 – 100 
internal funds measured by the median rate of cash flow. On the other hand, “Chemical and Plastic” firms don’t 
record the highest rates but, globally, have the most stable ones of the manufacturing industry. 
 
Table 3 
Note : mean, median and standard deviation are represented respectively, debt access is calculated as the ratio of long and medium term debts on 
total assets, financing cost is calculated as the ratio of financial interest on total debts 
 
“Agro-alimentary” firms have relatively a large debt access with relatively low cost. It is important to notice 
that “Wood, Cork and Furniture” firms have a high rate of financing cost. This rate can explain the limited access to 
debt and the low rate of investment. The low rate of internal funds characterizing “Building materials, Ceramic and 
Glass” explain the orientation of the latter to the external funds and its high investment rate.  
4.5.  Estimation results  
 
In this section, we represent the estimation results of the equations 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 to assess the financial 
constraints in 268 manufacturing firms during the period 1999-2005. We aim to test, first, the presence of financial 
constraints in manufacturing firms, then the impact of financial liberalization on access of these firms to external 
financing and finally, the existence of differences in financing constraints between different firms (in terms of size, 
exporter status and industry). The two columns of table 1 present the results of the estimation by Generalized 
Method of Moments investment equations “one step “ and “two step”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry Debt acess (%) Financial Cost (%) 
 
Agro-alimentary 0,42 (0,38) [0,22] 0,056 (0,052) [0,031] 
 
Building Materials, Ceramic and Glass 0,3 (0,22) [0,24] 0,052 (0,053) [0,027] 
 
Mechanic, Electric and Electronic 0,29 (0,25) [0,28] 0,062 (0,06) [0,037] 
 
Chemical and Plastic 0,29 (0,23) [0,24] 0,065 (0,064) [0,032] 
 
Textile, Clothing and Leather 0,28 (0,27) [0,17] 0,056 (0,05) [0,038] 
 
Wood, Cork and Furniture 0,23 (0,23) [0,09] 0,07 (0,066) [0,032] 
 
Pulp, Paper and Cardboard 
 
0,27 (0,27) [0,17] 
 
0,063 (0,061) [0,048] 
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Table 4 
Variables GMM One Step GMM Two Step 
  
Equation (1) 
 
Equation (2) 
 
Equation (1) 
 
Equation (2) 
 
(I/K)it-1 
 
0,202*** 0,086) 
 
0,157 (0,251) 
 
0,25*** (0,070) 
 
0,164 (0,124) 
 
(I/K)²it-1 
 
-0,040 (0,26) 
 
0,017 (0,108) 
 
-0,061*** (0,015) 
 
0,083 (0,093) 
 
(S/K)it 
 
-0,0008(0,006) 
 
0,006**(0,002) 
 
0,0002 (0,005) 
 
0,006**(0,002) 
 
(D/K)²it-1 
 
0,001  (0,006) 
 
0,005 (0,004) 
 
-0,001 (0,004) 
 
0,003 (0,003) 
 
(CF/K)it-1 
 
0,161*(0,088) 
 
0,379**(0,151) 
 
0,17** (0,077) 
 
0,258*(0,145) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*LFt-1 
 
- 
 
-0,394**(0,158) 
 
- 
 
-0,268*(0,151) 
 
Constant 
 
0,135***(0,039) 
 
0,144***(0,055) 
 
0,092*(0,052) 
 
0,111***(0,023) 
 
Fischer Test  
 
0,037 
 
0,007 
 
0,001 
 
0,000 
 
Autocorrelation first order 
Test  
 
0,000 
 
0,011 
 
0,111 
 
0,046 
 
Autocorrelation second 
order Test 
 
0,496 
 
0,326 
 
0,569 
 
0,458 
 
Sargan Test  
           
0,084 
 
0,090 
            
0,084 
 
0,092 
 
Hansen Test  
   
0,237 
 
0,628 
 
Notes: ***,**,* indicate statistical significanceatthe1Ͳ5and10percent(twoͲtail)testlevels,respectively.
 
The estimation results “One step” and “Two step” of the equations 1 and 2 are similar. The most important 
difference between the theoretical model and the empirical result is the positive coefficient of cash flow variable. 
The results show that the investment responds positively and significantly to cash flow (0,16) which confirms the 
presence of financial constraints in Tunisian manufacturing firms. Considering the financial liberalization index in 
the interaction term in the equation 2, the two estimations “one step” and “two step” show good results. The cash 
flow coefficient remains significantly positive (0,379 and 0,258). The coefficient of the interaction term financial 
liberalization and cash flow becomes significantly negative for both estimations “one step” and “two step”. It shows 
that as financial liberalization increases the sensitivity of investment to cash flow decreases. Finally, the results 
show that Tunisian manufacturing firms are suffering from financial constraints but with financial liberalization they 
are more eligible to the external financing.  
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Table 5 
Variables GMM  One Step GMM Two Step 
  
Equation(3) 
 
Equation (3) 
 
(I/K)it-1 
 
0,33***(0,11) 
 
0,39*** (0,065) 
 
(I/K)²it-1 
 
-0,135*** (0,046) 
 
-0,171*** (0,034) 
 
(S/K)it-1 
 
0,011**(0,005) 
 
0,013***(0,002) 
 
(D/K)²it-1 
 
0,009** (0,004) 
 
0,008*** (0,0006) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*smalli 
 
0,624** (0,279) 
 
0,783***(0,122) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*largei 
 
0,597**(0,295) 
 
0,308 (0,207) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*smalli*LFt-1 
 
-0,671**(0,295) 
 
-0,835***(0,129) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*largei*LFt-1 
 
-0,659* (0,337) 
 
-0,338  (0,225) 
 
Constant 
 
0,089**(0,044) 
 
0,054**(0,026) 
 
Fischer Test  
 
0,002 
 
0,000 
 
Autocorrélation first order Test 
 
0,007 
 
0,126 
 
Autocorrélation second order Test  
 
0,946 
 
0,839 
 
Sargan Test  
               
0,195 
 
Hansen Test  
 
0,543 
 
Variable coefficient linear Test  
 
(CF/K)it*smalli =(CF/K)it*largei 
 
(CF/K)it*smalli*LFt = (CF/K)it*largei*LFt 
 
 
 
 
 0 (NS) 
 
0 (NS) 
Notes: ***,**,* indicate statistical significanceatthe1Ͳ5and10percent(twoͲtail)testlevels,respectively.
 
The table 5 presents the estimation results of the equation 3 considering the firm size characteristic. First, we 
note that the estimation results “one step” and “two step” are similar.  Although, the estimate “two step” seems to 
give a better significance to the coefficient, Sargan test does not validate the instruments because the first order 
autocorrelation test is greater than 5%. Considering “one step” results, it is clear that small and large firms suffer 
from financial constraints (0,597 and 0,624 respectively). The coefficient linear test allows us to tell if the difference 
between investment-cash flow sensitivities for small and large firms is significant. According to the results, there is 
no difference between small and large firms confronting financial constraints. Moreover, the coefficient of 
interaction term financial liberalization, cash flow and size is significantly negative for large and small firms (-0,659 
and -0,671 respectively). However, the linear variables coefficients test shows no significant difference between 
small and large firms in financial constraints and in the impact of financial reforms. Contrary to the results of 
empirical work of Laeven (2002) and Koo and Chin (2004), liberalization in Korean financial markets seems to 
result in a reduction in financial constraints confronted by firms, especially small ones. 
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Table 6 
Variables GMM One Step GMM Two Step 
  
Equation (4) 
 
Equation (4) 
 
(I/K)it-1 
 
0,098 (0,245) 
 
0,008 (0,102) 
 
(I/K)²it-1 
0,0236 (0,103)  
0,119 (0,088) 
 
(S/K)it-1 
0,006***(0,002)  
0,009***(0,002) 
 
(D/K)²it-1 
0,002 (0,004)  
0,001 (0,003) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*expi 
0,741 (0,865)  
0,646*** (0,125) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*nexpi 
0,427***(0,161)  
0,420***(0,157) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*expi*LFt-1 
-0,818 (0,84)  
-0,722*** (0,124) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*nexpi*LFt-1 
-0,444*** (0,168)  
-0,441*** (0,163) 
 
Constant 
0,162***(0,054)  
0,132***(0,020) 
 
Fischer Test  
0,016  
0,000 
 
Autocorrelation first order Test  
0,012  
0,048 
 
Autocorrelation second order Test  
0,352  
0,465 
 
Sargan Test  
 
0,105 
 
Hansen Test  
 
0,352 
 
 Variable coefficient linear Test  
 
 (CF/K)it-1*expi =(CF/K)it-1*nexpi 
 
(CF/K)it-&*expi*LFt-1=(CF/K)it-1*nexpi*LFt-1 
 
 
 
 
0,98 (NS) 
 
1,46 (NS) 
 
Notes: ***,**,* indicate statistical significanceatthe1Ͳ5and10percent(twoͲtail)testlevels,respectively.
 
The table 6 presents the estimation results of equation 4 considering the exporter status of the firm. The 
estimation results “one step” and “two step” are similar except that the estimate “two step” allows better 
significance to the coefficients. The results show that both exporter and no exporter firms show a significantly 
positive coefficient (0,646 and 0,420 respectively). Considering the financial liberalization index, the coefficient 
becomes significantly negative (-0,722 and -0,441 respectively). Exporters as well as no exporters suffer from 
financial constraints and financial reforms reduce their constraints. The expected differences do not show up 
consistently (Gelos and Werner 2002), neither in financial constraints nor in the impact of financial liberalization. 
Based on the linear variables coefficients test, there is no significant difference between exporters and non exporters. 
They suffer from financial constraints and benefit from financial reforms at the same way. 
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Table 7 
Variables GMM One Step GMM Two Step 
 Equation (5) Equation (5) 
 
(I/K)it-1 
 
0,014 (0,222) 
 
0,086**  (0,034) 
 
(I/K)²it-1 
 
-0,192**(0,096) 
 
-0,223*** (0,071) 
 
(S/K)it-1 
 
-0,001 (0,003) 
 
-0,0022***(0,0008) 
 
(D/K)²it-1 
 
0,0029 (0,004) 
 
0,001 (0,001) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*SAgro 
 
0,346 (0,614) 
 
0,307** (0,121) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*SMCG 
 
0,086 (0,098) 
 
0,136** (0,068) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*SMEE 
 
0,091 (0,200) 
 
-0,085  (0,086) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*SCHP 
 
-0,256  (0,186) 
 
-0,204*** (0,046) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*STCL 
 
0,192  (0,147) 
 
0,208*** (0,068) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*SWCF 
 
0,02 (0,46) 
 
0,012 (0,076) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*SPPC 
 
3,104*** (0,839) 
 
2,934*** (0,319) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*SAgro*LFt-1 
 
-0,362 (0,653) 
 
-0,321** (0,129) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*SMCG*LFt-1 
 
0,633* (0,372) 
 
0,395*** (0,146) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*SMEE*LFt-1 
 
-0,497 (0,336) 
 
-0,369***(0,069) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*SCHP*LFt-1 
 
-0,057**(0,025) 
 
-0,063***(0,006) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*STCL*LFt-1 
 
-0,005 (0,02) 
 
-0,004*** (0,001) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*SWCF*LFt-1 
 
0,581 (0,945) 
 
0,467  (0,286) 
 
(CF/K)it-1*SPPC*LFt-1 
 
-4,004*** (1,107) 
 
-3,782*** (0,329) 
 
Constant 
 
0,302***(0,08) 
 
0,242***(0,022) 
 
Fischer Test  
 
0,000 
 
0,000 
 
Autocorrelation first order Test 
 
0,032 
 
0,043 
 
Autocorrelation order Test  
 
0,834 
 
0,463 
 
Sargan Test  
 
1,000 
 
Hansen Test  
                                       
0,542 
  
Variable coefficient linear Test  
(CF/K)it-1*SAgro =(CF/K)it-1*SMCG 
 
(CF/K)it-1*SAgro =(CF/K)it-1*STCL 
 
 (CF/K)it-1*SAgro =(CF/K)it-1*SPPC 
 
(CF/K)it-1* SAgro*LFt=(CF/K)it-1**SMEE *LFt-1 
 
(CF/K)it-1* SAgro*LFt=(CF/K)it-1**STCL *LFt-1 
 
(CF/K)it-1* SAgro*LFt=(CF/K)it-1**SPPC *LFt-1 
 
 
1,51 (NS) 
0,50 (NS) 
 
57,47*** 
 
0,09 (NS) 
 
6,02** 
 
92,58*** 
Notes: ***,**,* indicate statistical significanceatthe1Ͳ5and10percent(twoͲtail)testlevels,respectively.
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The table 7 presents the estimation results of equation 5 considering the industry characteristic. Similarly, we 
note that the results of estimating “one step” and “two step” are similar except that estimate “two step” allows better 
significance of the coefficients. The Sargan and Hansen tests validate the instruments used for both estimations. All 
the firms belonging to “Agro-alimentary”, “Building materials, ceramics and glass” , “textile, clothing and leather” 
and ‘pulp paper and paperboard” suffer from financial constraints since the cash flow coefficient is statistically and 
positively significant (0,307;0,136;0,208 and 2,933 respectively). We notice that “chemical and Plastic” industry 
show a significant and negative coefficient in cash flow (-0,204) and in the interaction term (-0,063). These firms 
don’t seem to suffer from financial constraints. On the other hand, financial liberalization doesn’t have any 
significant impact on their easy access to external financing resources. “Building materials, ceramics and glass” 
industry presents a significant and positive coefficient in interaction term (0,395) which means that this industry 
doesn’t benefit from financial reforms. Using the linear variables coefficients test, we find that “Pulp, Paper and 
Cardboard” industry are severely constrained in financing (2,934) and seem to be more influenced by liberalization. 
As a measure of financial liberalization increases, the cash-flow sensitivity of investment for “Pulp, Paper and 
Cardboard” firms significantly decreases (-3,782). This result is considered evidence for a benefit of financial 
liberalization. 
5. Impact of financial reforms on collateral: model, estimation method and results 
5.1.  An empirical model of investment, cash flow and asset tangibility 
To identify the effect of tangibility on investment we use the empirical model of Almeida and Campello (2006). 
It’s a model of investment demand, augmenting the traditional investment equation with a proxy for asset tangibility 
and an interaction term that allows the effect of financial liberalization to vary with asset tangibility. 
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Where fi firm and dt year capture firm- and year-specific effects, respectively. As we explain in detail below, we 
refer to equation 6 as our “baseline specification”. According to the theory, the extent to which internal funds matter 
for constrained investment should be an increasing function of asset tangibility. Equation 6  is a direct linear 
measure of the influence of financial liberalization on investment tangibility sensitivities. 
5.2.  Estimation Method 
 
To test our theory, we need to identify financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Following the work of 
Fazzari et al. (1988), the standard approach in the literature is to use exogenous, a priori sorting conditions that are 
hypothesized to be associated with the extent of financing frictions that firms face (Erickson and Whited 2000, 
Almeida et al., 2004, and Hennessy and Whited 2005). After firms are sorted into constrained and unconstrained 
groups, equation 1 could be separately estimated across those different categories. One of the central predictions of 
our theory, however, is that the financial constraint status is endogenously related to the tangibility of the firm’s 
assets. Hence, we need an estimator that incorporates the effect of tangibility both on cash flow sensitivities and on 
the constraint status. To allow for this effect, we follow Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) and Hovakimian and Titman 
(2004) and use a switching regression model with unknown sample separation to estimate our investment 
regressions. This model allows the probability of being financially constrained to depend on asset tangibility and on 
standard variables used in the literature (e.g., firm size, age, and growth opportunities). As explained next, the model 
simultaneously estimates the equations that predict the constraint status and the investment spending of constrained 
and unconstrained firms. Our analysis takes the switching regression model as the baseline estimation procedure.  
The switching regression model (endogenous constraint selection): Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) and 
Hovakimian and Titman (2004) provide a detailed description of the switching regression estimator.  
Assume that there are two different investment regimes, which we denote “regime 1” and “regime 2”. While we 
take the number of investment regimes as given, the points of structural change are not observable and are estimated 
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together with the investment equation for each one of the regimes. The model is composed of the following system 
of equations (estimated simultaneously): 
itit
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And the selection equation: 
         ititit Zy PI  
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Equations 7 and 8 are the structural equations of the system. They are essentially two different versions of our 
baseline equation 6. We compress the notation for brevity and let Xit = (Sit,, CFit , Tangit ,(Tang*FL)it ) be the vector 
of exogenous variables and Į be the vector of coefficients that relates the exogenous variables in X to investment 
ratios I1it and I2it. Differential investment behavior across firms in regime 1 and regime 2 will be captured by 
differences between Į1 and Į2. 
Equation 9 is the selection equation that establishes the firm’s likelihood of being in regime 1 or regime 2. The 
vector Zit contains the determinants of a firm’s propensity of being in either regime. Observed investment is given 
by: 
itit
it
K
I
K
I
1
¸
¹
·¨
©
§ ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§
if  0* ity   
itit
it
K
I
K
I
2
¸
¹
·¨
©
§ ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§
if  0* !ity                                                                 (10) 
Where y*it is a latent variable that gauges the likelihood that the firm is the first or the second regime. The 
parameters Į1, Į2 and ĳ are estimated via maximum likelihood. In order to estimate those parameters it is assumed 
that the error terms ȟ1, ȟ2 and ȝ are jointly normally distributed, with a covariance matrix that allows for nonzero 
correlation between the shocks to investment and the shocks to firms’ characteristics. The extent to which 
investment spending differs across the two regimes and the likelihood that firms are assigned to either regime are 
simultaneously determined. The approach yields separate regime-specific estimates for investment equations, 
dispensing with the need to use ex-ante regime sorting. We note that in order to fully identify the switching 
regression model we need to determine which regime is the constrained one and which regime is unconstrained. The 
algorithm specified in equations (6)-(10) creates two groups of firms that differ according to their investment 
behavior, but it does not automatically tell the econometrician which firms are constrained.  
To achieve identification, we need to use our theoretical priors about which firm characteristics are associated 
with financial constraints. As we will see below, this assignment turns out to be unambiguous in our data. One 
advantage of our approach is that it allows us to use multiple variables to predict whether firms are constrained or 
unconstrained in the selection equation (9). In contrast, the traditional method of splitting the sample according to a 
priori characteristics is typically implemented using one characteristic at a time. In particular, the estimation of the 
selection equation allows us to assess the statistical significance of a given factor assumed to proxy for financing 
constraints, while controlling for the information contained in other factors. Of course, one question is which 
variables should be used in the selection vector Z. Here, we follow the existing literature but add to the set of 
variables included in Z the main driver of our credit multiplier story: asset tangibility. The set of selection variables 
that we consider comes directly from Almeida and Campello (2006).  Those variables seem to naturally capture 
different ways in which financing frictions may be manifested. The set includes a firm’s size, Short Term Debt, 
Financial Slack and finally, Tangibility. The standard empirical approach uses ex-ante financial constraint sorting 
and least square regressions of investment equations, where estimations are performed separately for each constraint 
regime.  
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5.3.  Data and variables 
 
We derived an unbalanced panel dataset of the manufacturing firms over the period 1999–2005. We extract 134 
firms (25% of the smallest firms and the 25% of the largest ones) from the prior data. The detailed description of 
relevant variables is presented in Table 8.  
Table 8  
Abbreviation  Description 
 
 
Kt  Capital at the beginning of the period t (=tangible fixed assets at the beginning of the period t)  
 
It  Investment expenditure during the period t (K t+1 +Depreciations t - K t) 
 
CFt  Cash flow at the beginning of the period t (=net profit after-tax + Depreciation during period t)  
 
St  Sales at the beginning of the period t 
 
LFt  Financial Liberalization index at the beginning of the period t 
 
Tangt  ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets at the beginning of the period t 
 
STD t  ratio of short term debt to assets at the beginning of the period t  
 
Sizet  Logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the period t 
 
FSt  ratio of cash and liquid securities to assets at the beginning of the period t  
 
 
Table 9 
 
Tangibility 
I/K S/K 
 
CF/K 
 
Low High Low High Low High 
 
 
Median 
 
0,335 
 
0,136 
 
0,160 
 
8,631 
 
1,537 
 
0,626 
 
0,171 
 
Mean 
 
0,338 
 
0,245 
 
0,312 
 
15,194 
 
1,73 
 
0,898 
 
0,174 
 
Standard Deviation 
 
0,181 0,328 0,43 21,58 1,025 2,07 0,199 
  
This table displays summary statistics for investment, sales and cash flow reported to capital stock across 
groups of low and high tangibility firms. The purpose of this table is to check whether there are distributional 
patterns in those three variables that are systematically related with asset tangibility. We notice that although sales 
and cash flow are higher for low-tangibility firms group than for high-tangibility one, investment is more important 
for high-tangibility firms group than low-tangibility one. 
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5.4.  Results and interpretation  
Table 10 
Variables Structural Equations 
 Equation (2) 
 
Regime 1 : constrained 
Equation (3) 
 
Regime 2 : unconstrained 
 
(S/K)it 
 
0,002 (0,001) 
 
0,006**(0,002) 
 
(CF/K)it 
 
-0,017 (0,3) 
 
0,019 (0,13) 
 
Tangit 
 
0,419** (0,192) 
 
0,545***(0,146) 
 
Tangit*LFt 
 
-0,421**(0,177) 
 
-0,339**(0,15) 
 
Constant 
 
0,304*** (0,075) 
 
 
0,138**(0,057) 
 Endogenous Selection Regression 
 
Tangit 
 
-1,84***(0,514) 
 
Sizeit 
 
-0,903***(0,089) 
 
FSit 
 
1,63**(0,802) 
 
STDit 
 
-0,009 (0,14) 
 
Constant 
 
8,25***(0,877) 
 
Khi 2 Test 
 
0,053 
 
LR Test 
 
 
0,093 
 
The table 10 presents the results returned from the switching regression estimation of our baseline model 
(Equations. 7, 8 and 9). The top of the table 3 contains the results from the structural investment equations for 
constrained and unconstrained firms. The bottom of the table contains the results from the constraint selection 
equation. In addition, the last row of the table’s bottom reports P-values for the test of the null hypothesis that a 
single investment regime as opposed to two regimes (constrained versus unconstrained) is sufficient to describe the 
data. This test is based on a likelihood ratio statistic for which the Ȥ² distribution can be used for statistical 
inferences. We find that companies that are smaller, that carry greater financial slack are grouped together into one 
of the investment regimes (regime 1). The theoretical priors suggest that this is the group of firms that are most 
likely to be financially constrained. We also find that short-term debt ratio has relatively little effect on the 
likelihood of being classified in either group. More important for our study, note that Tangibility leads to a lower 
probability of being in regime 1, that is, a lower probability of facing financial constraints. 
The top of the Table 10 reports the central findings of this paper. Based on the results from the selection model, 
we call the firms classified in investment regime 1 (regime 2) constrained (unconstrained) firms. We notice that 
constrained and unconstrained firms’ investment is positively and significantly sensitive to asset tangibility (0,419 
and 0,545), while their investment-tangibility sensitivities are decreasing in financial liberalization by showing 
significant negative coefficients (-0,421 and -0,339). Further, the constrained firms’ coefficients are uniformly lower 
than those of the unconstrained samples. These findings are fully consistent with the presence of a multiplier effect 
for constrained firm investment. Because higher tangibility makes it more likely that a firm will be unconstrained, 
and eases the access to the credit market, positive effect of tangibility on investment is more important than for 
constrained firms (0,545>0,419). However, the financial liberalization has a higher significant and negative impact 
on investment-tangibility sensitivity for constrained firms than for unconstrained (|-0,421|>|-0,339|).  
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6. Concluding remarks 
The impact of financial liberalization, which has been implemented recently in many developing countries, has 
received much attention in the existing literature. This paper investigates whether financial liberalization affects 
firms’ investment behavior in Tunisia. The main empirical finding is that the financial constraint estimated by the 
cash-flow sensitivity of investment decreases with financial liberalization. This implies, first, that manufacturing 
firms in Tunisia are suffering from financial constraints but gradual financial liberalization improves firms’ 
accessibility to external finance. We tried to check whether some firm patterns can explain the existence of financial 
constraints and the impact of financial liberalization. We find that as well as small or large, as well as exporter or no 
exporter firms and almost all the industries suffer from financial constraints and profit from financial reforms. In 
particular, “Pulp, Paper and Cardboard” industry firms that were more severely constrained seem to gain more from 
financial liberalization. However, we underline that “Chemical and Plastic” firms seem to have an easy access to 
credit market and financial reform has no impact on it. Second, we find that collateral plays an important role in 
determining investment, but less with financial liberalization. While asset tangibility plays an important role in 
firms’ investment behavior, financial liberalization decreases these investment-tangibility sensitivities for financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms. Moreover, tangibility influences a firm’s credit status according to theoretical 
expectations: firms with more tangible assets are less likely to be financially constrained. The higher positive effect 
of tangibility on unconstrained investments is evidence for a credit multiplier in corporate investment.  
The poor state of the banks’ evaluating and monitoring capacities, together with prevailing legal and 
enforcement problems, led banks to rely heavily on collateral in their lending decisions: having real estate became 
more important for firms. Since this collateral-based lending probably increased the vulnerability of the financial 
sector, these facts highlight the need for a better understanding of the incentives guiding lending behavior in order to 
adopt effective banking regulation and supervision.  
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